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Introduction
In the spring of 2000, MP3.com faced lawsuits brought by five major record labels:
Warner Music Group, BMG Entertainment, EMI Group PLC, Sony Music Entertainment, and Universal Music Group. These five plaintiffs claimed that MP3.com, a service that allows users to listen to music online, had infringed upon their copyrights. By the end of August, MP3.com had settled with four out of the five record labels, paying each a reported $20 million. Each of these settlement contracts included a so-called "most-favored-nation" (MFN) provision: If MP3.com settled on better terms with another record label in the future, then the early settler would receive the better terms too.
1 Universal was the only record label that refused to settle on these terms. Early in the fall, a U.S. District Court Judge found that MP3.com had deliberately infringed copyrights and, several weeks later, a judgment for Universal was entered for $50 million.
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Since the $50 million was a "judgment" rather than a "settlement" the MFN clause was not triggered. 3 This paper argues that MFNs serve an important role in settlement with multiple plaintiffs and, in a parallel argument, with multiple defendants. 4 In a nutshell, MFNs commit the 1 The settlement also included a licensing provision that would allow MP3.com to continue providing the service. See "MP3.com Gets Ripped," Newsweek, September 18, 2000. 2 Anna Wilde Mathews and Colleen DeBaise, "MP3.com Deal Ends Lawsuit on Copyrights," The Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2000. After liability was determined, Judge Rakoff ruled that the damages would be $25,000 for each Universal CD that was digitally copied by MP3.com. A second trial was scheduled to determine was how many of Universal's disks were involved. The "judgment" of $50 million was actually negotiated in the judge's chambers on the eve of this second trial. 3 A salient feature of most MFN clauses is that they apply to settlement payments only, and not to awards made at trial. Not surprisingly, the four settling record companies challenged the $50 Million judgment. "It doesn't matter what you call it. This is a settlement," said one record executive. "If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, smells like a duck, it's a duck." See "Record Labels Fuming over Universal-MP3.com Ruling," Daily News, November 17, 2000. 4 There is a literature on settlement of litigation with multiple litigants, although it does not discuss MFNs or the issues discussed here. Miller (1998) gives a survey of the economics of defendant to be tough in future negotiations. Once the defendant has agreed to an MFN with one group of plaintiffs, it becomes very expensive for the defendant to settle on better terms with other plaintiffs. This paper highlights two reasons why the defendant may want to commit to be tough. First, MFNs mitigate the problem of asymmetric information when the plaintiffs are privately informed about the strengths of their cases. Second, MFNs are an effective mechanism for extracting value from future plaintiffs.
Formally, suppose that many plaintiffs are suing the same defendant. Each plaintiff has
private information about what will happen if his or her case goes to trial. It is well known that settlement negotiations may break down under these circumstances: plaintiffs who know that they have very strong cases will reject the defendant's offer to settle and will seek compensation at trial instead. 5 There will also be delay in settlement: many plaintiffs with weaker cases will settle on the courthouse steps. 6 These plaintiffs reject the defendant's early offers to settle because they anticipate, correctly, that the defendant's offers will rise over time. MFNs induce these "11 th hour" plaintiffs to accept early settlement offers instead.
This is an important effect. Since delay is inefficient --protracted litigation involves time, energy, and legal costs --MFNs can enhance both private and social welfare. Although
MFNs unambiguously lead cases to settle earlier, the overall effect on the settlement rate is not class action litigation, highlighting the conflict of interest between the (often self-appointed) attorney and the dispersed clients he represents. Che (1996 Che ( , 1999 looks at the incentive for plaintiffs with private information to consolidate their claims. Che and Yi (1993) consider the role of precedent in litigation and Daughety and Reinganum (1999 and consider settlement negotiations when the defendant may want to keep information about the lawsuit a secret from future plaintiffs. Revesz (1994a) and (1994b) look at multiple defendant lawsuits under joint and several liability, focusing on the externalities in settlement decisions, and Spier (2000) looks at similar externalities in lawsuits involving multiple plaintiffs and a potentially insolvent defendant. 5 Hay and Spier (1998) and Daughety (2000) give recent surveys of the settlement literature.
6 Spier (1992) shows why there are important deadline effects in pretrial bargaining.
as clear. When the plaintiffs' damages are uniformly distributed the overall settlement rate is unchanged by MFNs. More generally, however, we will see that the overall settlement rate falls if and only if the density function representing the plaintiffs' types is decreasing in the relevant range. A reduction in the overall settlement rate could potentially outweigh the cost savings from early settlement. In this case, MFNs could reduce social welfare.
The defendant may also want to adopt MFNs to capture a greater share of the future bargaining surplus. free to subsequently opt-out of the class and file individual lawsuits, opt-outs could not receive more money unless the main class was paid the difference as well.
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A frequently voiced concern with MFNs is that they destroy settlement opportunities. There is a large theoretical literature on the use of most-favored-customer clauses in supplier relationships.
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The paper most related to ours is Butz (1990) , where best-price provisions mitigate the time inconsistency problem that a monopolist faces when selling a durable good. 17 Coase (1972) argued that a monopolist selling a durable good will not capture full monopoly rents for the following simple reason. If customers with high valuations buy early on at a high price, the monopolist will lower the price later to sell to buyers with lower valuations. If customers expect the price to fall over time, they will be inclined to forego early 14 The court observed that no case law exists supporting the argument that MFNs constitute legal prejudice or deny due process. Kenneth L. Adams, who represented many of these plaintiffs, commented: "It [the MFN clause] was custom-designed, apparently because the class lawyers believe their settlement is too low. … Why are they afraid somebody else is going to get more?" See "$1. Lyon (1998) . Most of this literature asks whether these clauses can be used collusively to soften price competition. See, for example, Salop (1986) and Cooper (1986) . More recent work along these lines includes Besanko and Lyon (1993) , Schnitzer (1994) , McAfee and Schwartz (1994) , and Marx and Shaffer (2000) . Empirical work on this topic includes Crocker and Lyon (1994) and Scott Morton (1997) . 17 P'ng (1991) considers a related problem when the monopolist is learning about demand over time, and DeGraba and Postlewaite (1994) allow for interdependent demands of the buyers, as would be the case when they are rivals in a product market.
purchases and wait for the lower price. 18 Butz (1990) observed that the best-price provision is the mechanism by which the monopolist can commit not to lower the price later, and allows the monopolist to capture the full monopoly rents.
This paper has both important similarities and important differences. The obvious similarity with Butz (1990) is that both papers hinge on the time inconsistency problem. In the durable goods context, best price provisions commit the monopolist not to lower his price to make future sales. In our analysis, MFNs commit a defendant not to raise the settlement offer over time. But the policy implications of the two analyses differ dramatically. In Butz (1990) , best price provisions allow the monopolist to limit the quantity sold and therefore unambiguously harm social welfare.
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Here, by encouraging early rather than late settlement, MFNs serve to raise social welfare and, for certain parameter values, MFNs may increase the settlement rate (further increasing social welfare). Therefore the policy implications from the well-known durable goods monopoly problem do not apply in the litigation context.
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The next section of the paper lays out the basic the model where the population of plaintiffs is drawn from a continuous distribution. The third section presents comparative statics and evaluates the social welfare consequences of MFNs. The fourth section discusses several important extensions: a finite number of plaintiffs, multiple groups of plaintiffs, and the emergence of new information during negotiations. The fifth section presents the second reason 18 These ideas are formalized by Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982) . 19 Butz does say that the reader should not draw "sweeping policy conclusions" from this result. MFNs may necessary, for example, to cover the seller's fixed costs of production (see the discussion in the conclusion of Butz (1990) ) or to mitigate the holdup problem (see Butz (1995) ). 20 The underlying pretrial bargaining game is different from bilateral trade in two respects. First, the game is one of common values. A plaintiff's private information about damages will affect the payoffs of both the plaintiff and defendant should the case go to trial. Second, a settlement simply involves a cash transfer between the litigants. We will see that, as a consequence, time for MFN clauses in settlement: to enhance the defendant's bargaining position with later plaintiffs.
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The final section offers concluding remarks and discusses avenues for future research. does not screen among the plaintiff types here as it does in models of bilateral trade. For both of these reasons, the more familiar results from the durable goods monopoly fail to hold. 21 The idea is that MFNs can be used strategically to extract value from disorganized plaintiffs is related to Aghion and Bolton's (1987) Nalebuff (1987) for the equilibria in games where the plaintiff has the option to drop the case. 25 We are assuming the American rule where each party bears its own litigation costs. These costs would include both direct legal costs as well as opportunity costs such as loss of managerial focus. 26 We will restrict attention to pure strategies for the defendant.
The Model
results. First, trials could be risky in this framework. For example, let p be the probability that a plaintiff will win at trial (which is common knowledge), and let y be the damages awarded to the plaintiff conditional upon winning (which is privately observed by each plaintiff). Then the expected damages awarded at trial is x = py and all of our results are maintained.
27 Second, we may interpret the trials for the plaintiffs as taking place either jointly or separately. 28 If all plaintiffs are originally part of the same class action lawsuit, as in the vitamins case, then plaintiffs who reject the first round settlement in our model have "opted out" of the class.
Finally, the model assumes that the litigants do not discount the future. This assumption is made to simplify the exposition of the paper. If we assumed instead that the defendants and plaintiffs discount time at the same rate, then the results would all go through unchanged (except that the damages and costs would be in present discounted terms). Other generalizations of the model that would require additional analysis, including a finite number of plaintiffs and the revelation of information over time, are discussed in Section 4.
Before characterizing the defendant's optimal offers, we will first construct the plaintiffs' optimal settlement strategies given the (anticipated) sequence of offers, 1 S and 2 S , assuming that the defendant is not using MFNs. Suppose that after observing the first round offer, 1 S , the plaintiffs expect that the second round offer will be 2 S . Each plaintiff has three choices --to accept 1 S , to wait and accept 2 S , or to reject both offers and go to trial --and makes this decision to maximize compensation net of costs. When measured from the beginning of round 1, 27 Risk neutrality is important here, however. With risk aversion, uncertainty introduces inefficient risk bearing at trial. 28 Importantly, though, we have assumed a constant returns to scale technology where the cost of litigating a case is independent of the number of cases brought. This is clearly not accurate as a representation of class action litigation, for class members are able to take advantage of economies of scale, while individual plaintiffs who opt out would forego these economies. 
( 1) A plaintiff with damages above this cutoff, * x x > , will reject both offers and go to trial. A plaintiff with damages below this cutoff, * x x ≤ , will settle out of court for the better of the two offers and may mix between the two offers when
It is interesting (and important) to note that all plaintiffs have the same preference orderings over the two settlement offers. If one plaintiff, type x say, prefers 1 S to 2 S then another plaintiff, type y, will also prefer 1 S to 2 S . The plaintiffs differ, of course, in their preferences between settling and going to trial: plaintiffs with weak cases settle and those with strong cases go to trial. This property implies that the passage of time before the last round of settlement does not screen among the plaintiffs in the usual sense. In models of bilateral trade, for example, high valuation buyers strictly prefer to purchase sooner than their low valuation counterparts.
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Lemma 1: Suppose the plaintiffs anticipate a sequence of offers, 1 S (without an MFN) and 2 S .
Define
. Plaintiffs with damages * x x ≤ settle out of court and 29 For more discussion of the relationship between these two models, see Spier (1992) .
plaintiffs with damages * x x > go to trial.
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Settlement With Commitment
We will now establish an important benchmark. If the defendant can commit to the sequence of offers, 1 S and 2 S , then a positive mass of settlement will take place in the first round and all remaining plaintiffs will go to trial. To see why this is true, suppose instead that there is a positive mass of settlement in each round:
. 31 Since the plaintiffs are rational, they must be indifferent between the two settlement offers, 1 S and 2 S . Using the previous lemma, there is a cutoff, x*, where
. The defendant's total expected payments are:
The defendant pays 1 S to the mass of plaintiffs who accept in the first round ( Now all plaintiffs with * x x ≤ will accept the first offer, no plaintiff will accept the second offer, and the defendant's payments are lower than before:
The defendant's optimal settlement strategy is characterized by a cutoff, x , and the corresponding settlement offer,
, that minimizes the expression in (3). 
Intuitively, the defendant does not want settlement to take place in the second round because delay is inefficient. By committing to a sufficiently unattractive second round offer, the defendant encourages all plaintiffs with low damages, x x≤ , to settle in the first round. In this way, the defendant saves both his own delay cost c d and extracts c p from these plaintiffs in settlement. The first-order condition defining the cutoff x , equation (4), may be understood intuitively. When the defendant increases the settlement offer 1 S by a small amount, ∆ , there are both costs and benefits. The cost is that he pays an additional ∆ to settle with all plaintiff types below x , so the cost is ) (x F ∆ . The benefit is that plaintiffs in the range ] , ( ∆ + x x will now settle in the first round rather than go to trial. The mass of plaintiffs in this range is approximately ) (x f ∆ and the cost savings on these plaintiffs is ) (
. The optimal cutoff, x , equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit.
Settlement Without Commitment
In the previous section, a truncated distribution of plaintiffs,
, remain in the 31 The case of
is very similar and is not presented here. 32 This is the first-order necessary condition for x to minimize (2). The monotone hazard rate condition assures that the solution is unique and that the second-order condition is satisfied. second round. The defendant's second round offer,
, was not sequentially rational.
If not fully committed to this sequence, the defendant would make an offer that at least some of the remaining plaintiffs would accept:
. 
In equilibrium, 0 ) ( ) ( ) (
In contrast to the benchmark case in Proposition 1, both 1 M and 2 M are positive here --there is a positive mass of settlement in each round. This is a necessary feature of the equilibrium: for
to be sequentially rational, it is necessary that mass
of plaintiffs with damages x x≤ remain in the second round. If fewer
remained, then the defendant would want to raise his offer above The first-order necessary condition stated in the Proposition may be understood intuitively. In addition to the marginal cost and the marginal benefit described for the commitment case, there is now an additional term. This third term represents the change in the volume of cases that settle in the second round. If the defendant increases the first round settlement offer (and the corresponding cutoff x ) by a small amount, ∆ , then the volume of cases that settle in the second round would rise by
Therefore on the margin the associated cost rises by
. Notice that this term may be either positive or negative.
Proof: Let 1 S and 2 S be the equilibrium sequence of offers. Following Lemma 1 we define
First we will prove that
, so 2 S is at least as attractive to the plaintiffs as 1 S .
Let g(x) be the population density of plaintiff types that remain in round 2, and let G(x) be the cumulative distribution. 34 (To simplify the proofs we assume that these functions are well-
arguments, the defendant would settle with a positive mass of plaintiffs in the second round (See Bebchuk, 1984) . It follows that 0 2 > M . Therefore the second round offer must be at least as attractive as the first round offer:
to be sequentially rational. Suppose that the defendant instead offers
Since plaintiffs with damages below ∆ + x accept this offer and those with damages above reject the offer, the defendant's continuation payments are:
Taking the derivative with respect to ∆ tells us that
. If this were not true, the defendant would choose a positive ∆ . Now suppose instead that the defendant offers
. Plaintiffs with damages below ∆ − x accept this offer and those with damages above reject the offer and go to trial. The defendant's continuation payments are
Differentiation establishes that
, for otherwise the defendant would lower the settlement offer. Combing these two conditions we have
the claim is proven.
Finally, the fact that all x x≤ settle out of court (Lemma 1) and
. Combining these claims, we may write the defendant's total payment as a function of x alone:
The defendant could do no better than offer
where x minimizes this expression, and the first-order necessary condition is in the proposition. < Sequential rationality dictates that the defendant makes a second round offer that a positive mass of plaintiffs will accept. It follows that a positive mass of plaintiffs must "wait"
for the second round offer, plaintiffs who ideally should have settled in the first round. The defendant is of course hurt by his inability to commit to the sequence of settlement offers.
Holding the cutoff x fixed in Proposition 2, the defendant could strictly reduce his total payments by committing to a second period offer
. Through this commitment, all plaintiffs with damages below x would accept in the first round, saving the defendant money. 
Settlement With Most-Favored-Nations Clauses
In this section we will show that the defendant can achieve full commitment power through a most-favored-nation clause in the first round. Specifically, suppose a mass of plaintiffs accepts 1 S with an MFN in the first round and that the defendant subsequently offers to settle for 1 2 S S > in the second round. A most-favored-nation provision obligates the defendant to pay the early settling plaintiffs the difference between the offers: 1 2 S S − . We will argue that this obligation makes raising the offer in the second round prohibitively expensive for the defendant. Although this commitment not to raise the offer destroys value ex post (because settlement opportunities are destroyed), it is valuable to the defendant from an ex ante perspective because more cases settle early.
Proposition 3: The defendant can achieve the full commitment outcome characterized in Proposition 1 by offering to settle in the first round for
, together with a most- First, we will show that the defendant will rationally choose not to settle in round 2 with any of the remaining plaintiffs. Suppose not. The defendant's offer in the second round, 2 S , makes some plaintiff with damages x x* > indifferent between accepting 2 S and going to trial.
Plaintiffs with *] , ( x x x ∈ strictly prefer to accept the second round offer, and those above x* will reject it and go to trial. Notice that x x* > implies that
The MFN from the first round will obligate the defendant to pay the early settlers the difference, 1 2 S S − . We may write the defendant's total continuation payments as
The first term represents the settlement payments made to all types *] , ( x x x ∈ ; the second term represents the total payments made at trial with the higher types; the third term represents the additional payments made to the early settlers under the MFN. Replacing 2 S with p k x − * and rearranging terms gives the defendant's continuation payments:
Taking the derivative, we see that the slope of this function is
From Proposition 1, the first-order necessary condition for x to be the optimal commitment of the plaintiff and defendant. (Here, the defendant pockets the entire savings.)
for all x x* > . Therefore the defendant offers .
It is clearly in the interest of plaintiffs with x x≤ to accept the first offer. The plaintiffs do not expect the offers to improve over time, and so they interpret 
Comparative Statics and Social Welfare Implications of MFNs
In the previous section, we argued that MFNs commit the defendant not to raise his settlement offers over time. Plaintiffs who would have otherwise waited to settle on the courthouse steps are induced to settle early. This has an obvious private and social benefit:
36 Notice that this strategy is not unique. In fact, the defendant could offer to settle for
. None of the remaining plaintiffs would accept this offer, so the MFN clause would not obligate the defendant to pay additional money to the early settlers.
MFNs economize on the costs of delay. Indeed, holding the settlement offers fixed at
, a social planner would want the parties to include an MFN in their contract. But the terms of settlement are chosen opportunistically by the defendant, and will generally change when MFNs are adopted. This section compares the two equilibria from the previous section to see how the terms of settlement, the rate of settlement, and social welfare change when MFNs are permitted.
The next lemma characterizes the relationship between x , the cutoff when MFNs are used, and x , the cutoff when MFNs are not permitted.
Lemma 2:
Proof: Restating equation (4), the cutoff without MFNs, x , is the solution to:
Restating equation (5), the cutoff with MFNs, x , is the solution to:
These two expressions differ in that equation (5) (5), and so it must be the case that 0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 
, and the overall settlement rate is ) (x F .
(See Proposition 2.) So we see that the overall settlement rate may either rise or fall, depending on the relationship between x and x . The following proposition follows from Lemma 2.
Proposition 4: MFNs increase (resp. decrease, leave unchanged) the overall settlement rate if
It is also straightforward to characterize the effect of MFNs on the plaintiffs' welfare.
Referring back to Propositions 2 and 3, the defendant's first-round offer with an MFN clause is
, and the defendant's first-round offer without an MFN clause is
. If x x> then the first-round offer is clearly higher under the MFN regime.
When the first round offer is higher, plaintiffs who accept the offer are better off and those who reject the offer and go to trial instead are no worse off than before.
Proposition 5: MFNs weakly increase (resp. weakly decrease, leave unchanged) the plaintiffs' welfare if and only if 0
).
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What can we say about social welfare more generally? We end this section with a comparison of the total costs of litigation and delay under the two regimes. Since settlement payments are simply monetary transfers between the plaintiff and defendant, we start by taking these payments from a social welfare perspective.
When MFNs are prohibited or commitment is not possible, the total costs are:
where x is defined in Proposition 2. This expression is very intuitive. Consider the first term.
is the volume of cases that go all the way to trial and ) (
are the total costs borne in these cases. In the second term,
is the volume of cases that settle in the second round and ) ( d p c c + are the costs. From Proposition 3, the total wasted resources when the defendant uses MFNs, thereby committing to settle in the first round only, are:
Using these two expressions we see that the cost savings that come from the use of MFNs, which is the change in social welfare, is: 
Example #1: The Uniform Distribution
. Comparing (4) and (5) we see that the plaintiff type who is indifferent between settling and litigating in the two regimes is exactly the same: x = x . This has several important implications. The overall rate of settlement is unchanged when MFNs are used and the plaintiffs are equally well off under the two regimes.
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The defendant, however, is strictly better off because MFNs shift the timing of settlement. Cases that would have settled in the second round settle in the first round instead. It follows that the total social costs unambiguously fall when the plaintiffs' damages are uniformly distributed.
Example #2: The Exponential Distribution
We will now show that MFNs can have very positive welfare effect even when the distribution of plaintiff types is everywhere decreasing. Consider, for example, the exponential distribution,
. A straightforward evaluation of equations (4) and (5) give us closed-form solutions for x and x : payoff in each.
Comparing these two expressions we see that x < x --the overall settlement rate falls when MFNs are adopted. This cost is represented by the second term in equation (16). The benefit is that cases that would have settled in the second round now settle in the first round instead. This benefit is represented by the first term in equation (16). It is easy to verify that the benefit always outweighs the cost for the exponential distribution. In closing, there are other reasons to think that the social welfare consequences of MFNs may be either higher of lower than those discussed here. First, the analysis was limited to the costs of delay and litigation. One could go further and argue that MFNs are also bad for social welfare because they allow the defendant to reduce his total expected payments, leading the 38 The first round settlement offers are the same:
. defendant to take fewer precautions. It is important to note, however, that the dilution of ex ante incentives could be addressed by increasing the defendant's liability through, for example, a damage multiplier. Second, one might be concerned about the public good aspect of litigation (e.g. trials are important so the law can evolve efficiently). Since the main effect of MFNs is to encourage early settlement rather than create a barrier to litigation, the public interest in litigation is preserved. A full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Discussion
This section changes several assumptions of the basic analysis with two goals in mind.
The first is to indicate how the basic results would be modified in more realistic situations. The second is to shed light on recent legal cases and the practical use of MFNs in settlement.
A Small Number of Plaintiffs
The previous sections assumed that plaintiffs were drawn from a continuum, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic. Even large class action lawsuits involve a finite number of individuals, and many lawsuits in which MFNs are adopted involve small numbers of plaintiffs, such as the MP3.com case. This section argues that although MFNs are ineffective when there is exactly one plaintiff, they may be useful in cases involving small numbers of similar plaintiffs, although they will not typically implement the full-commitment outcome.
To start, suppose that there is a single plaintiff whose damages are drawn from the probability density function f(x), and these damages are private information. (In the previous sections, f (x) described an entire population of plaintiffs.) The defendant would like to commit to the very same sequence of settlement offers specified in Proposition 1, but cannot do so. The 39 Shavell (1997) and Spier (1997) discuss the social desirability of private settlement.
reason why MFNs worked so beautifully earlier was that they served as a valuable strategic commitment not to raise the offer in the future. With a single plaintiff, MFNs are an ineffective commitment device.
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Suppose instead that there are N plaintiffs, each with damages that are independently drawn from a common probability density function f(x). The defendant would like to commit to a first period offer,
, and a sufficiently unattractive second round offer that any remaining plaintiff would reject. In the full commitment outcome, plaintiffs with damages x x≤ would accept the first round offer and plaintiffs with damages x x> would reject both offers and go to trial. MFNs cannot implement the full commitment outcome here for the following simple reason: If all plaintiffs happen to have x x> , then nobody will accept the first round offer. In this case, nothing prevents the defendant from raising his offer to the remaining plaintiffs, skimming off plaintiffs with damages near the bottom of the truncated distribution. The same would be true if an unexpectedly small number of plaintiffs accepted in the first round. In this case, MFN adjustments would be paid on the equilibrium path.
Although the defendant cannot implement the full commitment outcome, MFNs are useful because they will prevent settlement in the second round with positive probability (albeit smaller than unity). The partial commitment power afforded by MFNs should be preferred to no commitment at all. A full formal analysis of this case is left for future research.
Multiple Groups of Plaintiffs
The main analysis assumed that although individual plaintiffs were heterogeneous, they all looked the same to the (uninformed) defendant before trial. Consequently, the defendant was not able to directly price discriminate among the different plaintiffs in the first round --the same settlement terms were offered to each plaintiff. We argued that MFNs are valuable within these plaintiff groups because they commit the defendant to not raise his offer (folic acid) from the agreement, allowing the defendant to settle in the future on better terms on these issues. 44 More often, however, the exceptions are broadly specified as litigants who are not "similarly situated" with the early settlers. In Corrugated Container litigation, a price fixing case involving many defendants, the MFN clause was interpreted to not apply to defendants who received better terms later because of their inability to pay ("hardship settlements") and was held not to apply to defendants who were not indicted in related criminal cases. 45 Presumably defendants who were not the targets of criminal investigations were less culpable than their indicted counterparts.
The strategy of distinguishing between multiple groups of plaintiffs is often tricky. First, even if the defendant could privately distinguish between a Group A plaintiff and a Group B plaintiff, this information may be difficult or impossible to contract upon. Consequently, the litigants may try to take advantage of the "similarly situated" clause ex post. This may manifest itself in a variety of ways.
First, consider the Group A plaintiffs who reject the settlement offer in the first round.
42 Proposition 1 shows how the optimal settlement offer depends on the distribution of damages as well as the litigation and delay costs. 43 The desire to distinguish between groups appears in many other contexts as well. In natural gas markets, for example, MFNs typically apply withing the boundaries of each field and not across fields. See Butz (1986) . 44 See 22 They may argue that they, in fact, are not "similarly situated" to the others in Group A and should therefore be exempt. This situation frequently arises in practice. In the Vitamins case, for example, plaintiff Nutra-Blend argued that it was unique position as a blender and suffered greater damages than the other class members and should therefore be permitted to receive more in settlement.
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Second, suppose the defendant wants to give members of Group B a better deal than Group A. The members of Group A who have already accepted settlement offers now have every incentive to try to prove that, in fact, the members of Group B were "similarly situated" to themselves. If they can convince a court that the Group B plaintiffs are similar to them, then they would be entitled to the MFN payout! In the Corrugated Container case, the defendants who settled early argued that the lesser payments made later by insolvent defendants (the "hardship settlements" mentioned earlier) should trigger the MFN provision and entitle them to a refund. The court disagreed.
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Third, the defendant may have an incentive to misrepresent the truth ex post as well. At the beginning of round 2, the defendant may try to argue that Group A plaintiffs who rejected the first round offer are actually members of Group B. In that way, the defendant could get around his earlier commitment not to raise the offer and extract some additional value in settlement. Of course, if these types of activities were anticipated by the Group A plaintiffs before the first round, then the value of MFNs would be greatly diminished.
In summary, the use of MFNs across groups will lead to opportunistic behavior.
Opportunism will tend to undermine the positive effects of MFNs that were identified in previous sections. In addition, these rent-seeking activities may be costly in and of themselves, as is evidenced by the follow-on litigation described in the preceding paragraphs. For these reasons, MFNs that attempt to distinguish between different groups of plaintiffs using broad language may destroy rather than create value for the defendant. Therefore the defendant may forego price discrimination and use MFNs across the two groups, or not use MFNs at all.
Another reason why MFNs may be useful across groups (in addition to within them) arises when groups have small numbers of plaintiffs. 48 As discussed in Section 4.1, MFNs are completely ineffective when a group has exactly one plaintiff, and are less than fully effective groups of finite size. If the second group is not too different from the first, then the defendant may want to pool the two groups together and have the MFN apply across the two groups. This may be seen most obviously when the first group is very large (so the full commitment outcome is essentially achieved) and the second group has exactly one plaintiff. If the MFN with the first group applies to the second group, then it will commit the defendant not to raise the offer to this lone plaintiff. If the lone plaintiff is not too different from the earlier plaintiffs, then this is a valuable strategy.
The Defendant's Liability is Established After the MFN is Signed
Many settlement agreements with MFNs, including the Corrugated Container case, stipulate that the provision is voided if "present circumstances" change. The previous sections assumed that the underlying distribution of expected damages did not change over time. That is, the litigants did not learn any additional information relevant to their cases before the ultimate trial. This section relaxes this assumption by assuming that the defendant's liability is established when the costs c p and c d are sunk before the round 2 offers.
One could think of this second round as taking place after discovery, or alternatively after the first stage of a bifurcated trial. At this point, the plaintiff and defendant will learn whether the case has sufficient merit to proceed. If it is determined at this point that the defendant is not liable, then the plaintiffs cases will be dismissed or dropped. Would the defendant still want to use an MFN provision under these circumstances? We will see that, perhaps surprisingly, the answer is yes.
Suppose that px y = where p is the probability that defendant will be found liable, and x is a plaintiff's damages. As before, plaintiffs are heterogeneous and their damages x are drawn from the density function f(x). The parameter p is common to all cases, however, and the defendant and plaintiffs are symmetrically uninformed about its value in round 1. Assume that p takes on the value 1 with probability θ and 0 with probability 1−θ. If it is discovered that p = 0 then the game ends. There is no more basis for the lawsuit and the cases are either dismissed or dropped with no further costs incurred. If it is discovered that p = 1, however, then the stakes are higher than before. When it is discovered that the defendant is liable for sure, the settlement offer would rise to reflect the stakes. We will show that all of the earlier results continue to hold.
In particular, the defendant would like to commit not to deal with plaintiffs who delay settlement, even when the damning information comes to light.
Suppose that the plaintiffs expect a sequence of offers 1 S and 2 S . A plaintiff will prefer the early offer to the later offer when
, and will prefer to settle for 2 S rather than go to trial when
. It is then easy to establish the following result. 
<
There are examples of lawsuits where defendants have tried to renege on their MFN obligations as a consequence of this type of information. The message from the theory is clear.
First, it is in the defendant's interest to commit to MFNs under these circumstances. Second, although it might be in a defendant's ex post interest to renege on the deal (it was in Section 3 as well), it would not be in their ex ante interest. Plaintiffs, expecting that the obligation would be voided, would not be willing to settle early, eliminating the positive benefits of MFNs.
Therefore it is in the interest of defendants more generally for these agreements to be enforced as written.
It is important to note, however, that MFNs may also have a downside when information is arriving over time. Better information allows the defendant to better tailor his settlement offer to the situation at hand. Under more general conditions than those presented here, new information would affect the cutoff in plaintiff type space in the second round. In other words, the arrival of new information may create option value for the defendant, and therefore he may not want to settle in the first round only. 51 A full treatment of the value of information in 51 In the simple example presented above, all cases were dropped if the defendant was found not liable. The cutoff that the defendant wanted to implement before the arrival of information was the same as the cutoff he wanted to implement before the arrival of information. If we had instead assumed that the probability of winning at trial was revealed to be either 1/4 or 1, the optimal cutoff would change.
settlement is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
MFNs as a Bargaining Tool
The previous sections argued that MFNs are valuable to the defendant (in cases with multiple plaintiffs) --and often to society as a whole --because they mitigate the problem of asymmetric information and lead to earlier settlement. For tractability, this point was illustrated in a model where the defendant could make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the plaintiffs. When this assumption is relaxed, so the plaintiffs have bargaining power as well, then MFNs may be adopted for a second reason as well. Simply put, MFNs commit the defendant to be a tough negotiator and limit the surplus that future plaintiffs can capture in settlement negotiations.
52
Although MFN clauses may be privately desirable for this reason, they tend to be socially wasteful.
MFNs can lead future negotiations to break down, and the resulting costs of breakdown are not fully internalized by the original contracting parties.
53
To illustrate this new set of issues, this section assumes that the defendant and the plaintiffs are symmetrically informed about the value of the cases. First, we will characterize the effect of a pre-existing MFN has on settlement negotiations between the defendant and a single plaintiff. Second, we will present two stylized examples to illustrate the incentives of the defendant to include an MFN clause in his settlement contracts to begin with.
The Effect of a Pre-Existing MFN on Settlement.
Suppose that the defendant has settled an earlier case for S 1 with an MFN clause. The defendant is now facing a second plaintiff whose expected damage award at trial is x. This value is observed by the defendant as well as the plaintiff, so there is symmetric information during settlement negotiations. Will the defendant and the second plaintiff agree to settle the case? If so, what will the terms of settlement be?
To answer these questions, we will construct the lower and upper bounds of the bargaining range. The least that the second plaintiff is willing to accept, S , is simply:
the plaintiff's expected award at trial minus the litigation costs. This lower bound is unaffected by the terms of settlement from the earlier case, S 1 .
The upper bound on the bargaining range is more subtle. 54 If the defendant settles with the second plaintiff for 1 2 S S > , then he will be obligated contractually to pay . 55 The most that the defendant is willing to pay the second plaintiff, S , makes the defendant indifferent between accepting the offer and going to trial,
Using the expressions for S and S , it is easy to prove the following:
Proposition 8: Suppose that the defendant has settled an earlier case for S 1 with an MFN clause, 53 This kind of effect was also featured in Aghion and Bolton (1987 
The Private Incentive to Use MFNs
This section presents two stylized examples to show why MFNs may be adopted in equilibrium. In the first example, two plaintiffs arrive simultaneously in the first round but negotiate independently with the defendant (they do not consolidate their claims). We will see that the defendant can exploit the two plaintiffs through MFN clauses, settling the two cases for less than they would settle for otherwise. In this first example, MFNs simply redistribute value among the litigants. In the second example, the two plaintiffs arrive sequentially, one in each round. The defendant and the first plaintiff adopt an MFN clause to "grab value" from the second plaintiff. In addition to redistributing value among the litigants, we will see that value will be destroyed in equilibrium. When the second plaintiff's damages are high, second round negotiations will fail and litigation costs will be wasted.
Simultaneous Plaintiffs
A defendant is facing two plaintiffs simultaneously. Each plaintiff has damages x drawn from distribution f(x). The realization of the parameter x is not known in the first round of negotiations, so the litigants are symmetrically uninformed at that point. The parameter x will be revealed to the all litigants before the second round, however. Consider the following timing. 
MFNs, all of the bargaining surplus is conceded to the plaintiffs. This is a standard result: the player who makes the last offer captures the surplus. Now suppose instead that the defendant offers S 1 with an MFN clause. If one plaintiff expects that the other plaintiff will accept the offer, then using Proposition 8 we can write that plaintiff's payoff from rejecting the first round offer as:
In the low range, the plaintiff demands the full . This reflects the additional payments that the defendant will have to make to the other plaintiff who settled 58 The assumption that the defendant has all of the bargaining power in the first round and the plaintiff has all of the bargaining power in the second round was made to streamline the analysis. banned. While interesting and important, the effects on incentives to take ex ante precautions is beyond the scope of this paper.
MFNs are used here precisely because they can take advantage of a lack of coordination among the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs are well-organized, as they probably were in class action lawsuits like the Vitamins case, we would not expect to see MFNs adopted for the reason identified here. Indeed, the ability of the defendant to take advantage of plaintiffs in this way gives the plaintiffs the incentive to coordinate their lawsuits and hire a common lawyer to A more general analysis would allow a coin flip to determine who makes the offer in each round, but the same underlying effects would be present. 59 The careful reader will notice that there is a second equilibrium where both plaintiffs reject the settlement offers. The plaintiffs do better in this second equilibrium, for they will receive
in expectation. Although this second equilibrium certainly Pareto dominates the first, it is not the "risk dominant" equilibrium. Therefore we would expect that the defendant could take advantage of the plaintiffs as described in the text so long as 1 S is not too small. See the related discussion in Spier (2000) . represent them.
Sequential Plaintiffs
Now suppose instead that the two plaintiffs arrive sequentially. The defendant negotiates with the first plaintiff before the second plaintiff appears. At the time of the first round negotiations, it is known that the second plaintiff's damages, x, are drawn from distribution f(x), but the realization of x is not known until the second plaintiff actually arrives. We will see that the decision to include an MFN in the first round hinges upon the defendant's expectations of his future bargaining power in the second round.
Suppose that the defendant expects to have all of the bargaining power when negotiating with the second plaintiff or, equivalently, the ability to make a take-or-or-leave-it offer. Without an MFN clause, the defendant would offer to settle with the second plaintiff for Now suppose instead that the defendant expects to have no bargaining power in the second round. The second plaintiff will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the defendant.
Without the MFN, the defendant would be forced to settle for The expected social cost is
, the litigation costs multiplied by the probability that negotiations ultimately break down.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has focused on two particular reasons for the existence of MFNs in settlement contracts. In the main analysis, MFNs are valuable because they commit the defendant not to raise his settlement offers over time and therefore encourage early settlement. We also presented 60 The defendant does not lose anything when negotiations break down. The losses are borne by the second plaintiff, who can no longer extract the bargaining surplus. 61 The magnitude of the first round offer will be determined by negotiations. The defendant would like 1 S to be as small as possible (he pays 1 S to the first plaintiff and is driven down to his outside option in the second round), while the first plaintiff would like 1 S to be as large as possible. To see why this latter statement is true, write the first plaintiff's continuation payoff as is not true if the case would have otherwise settled for a fixed amount. In this latter case, the defendant and plaintiffs face less risk if they settle for a fixed amount, and are worse off if the settlement will be adjusted over time. 62 Another rationale is that MFNs may serve to discourage future suits. Since plaintiffs would be forced to bring their cases all the way to trial, it may discourage them from bringing the case at all. This does beg the question of why this plaintiff would be able to extract a settlement offer to begin with, if their case is too weak to pursue.
It is also plausible that MFNs may allow an informed defendant to signal his type to the plaintiffs. 63 The defendant might argue: "I am not liable for your damages, so I will settle with you for a token amount. If it is ever determined that I am lying to you, and I settle with someone else for more, then you will receive the difference." While this signaling story may have some appeal, it is not consistent with an important feature of most (but not all) of the MFN clauses that we observe in practice. The clause is typically applied to settlement only, and not to awards made at trial. With this type of private information, a defendant could signal more credibly by making the MFN apply more broadly to awards if some cases proceed to trial.
62 Notice these inefficiencies would be greater if MFNs applied to judgments at trial. See McAvoy (1962) and Broadman and Montgomery (1983) for discussions of risk sharing and most favored customer clauses in natural gas contracts.
63 Levy (2000) shows that best price guarantees can be an effective signal of quality when a monopolist is selling a durable good, and that these guarantees may increase social welfare.
